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A $27.5-billion deficit revision raises questions Parliament should address
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| Citation | Drummond, Don, and Yves Giroux . 2026. A $27.5-billion deficit revision raises questions Parliament should address. Opinions & Editorials. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. |
| Page Title: | A $27.5-billion deficit revision raises questions Parliament should address – C.D. Howe Institute |
| Article Title: | A $27.5-billion deficit revision raises questions Parliament should address |
| URL: | https://cdhowe.org/publication/a-27-5-billion-deficit-revision-raises-questions-parliament-should-address/ |
| Published Date: | November 19, 2026 |
| Accessed Date: | November 19, 2026 |
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Outline
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Published in The Hill Times
By Don Drummond and Yves Giroux
A revision of this magnitude is unusual, particularly given that the SEU was released almost a month after the close of the 2025-26 fiscal year.
The 2026 Budget does not adequately explain a substantial revision to the Spring Economic Update’s estimate of the 2025-26 deficit, yet this revision lies at the heart of the budget’s significant increase in spending. Parliament should investigate the reasons for such a large revision and how the government incorporated it into its fiscal planning.
The Nov. 5 federal budget puts the 2025-26 deficit at $39.3-billion, $27.5-billion lower than the $66.9-billion estimated in the April 28 economic update (SEU). Revenues were $14.9-billion higher than in the SEU; program spending (excluding net actuarial changes) was $14.2-billion lower; public debt charges were $500-million lower; and the net actuarial change added $2.1-billion to the deficit.
To put the revision in perspective, it represents 41.1 per cent of the SEU deficit estimate; the revenue gain is 2.8 per cent of budgetary revenues, and the spending lapse is 2.6 per cent of program spending.
A revision of this magnitude is unusual, particularly given that the SEU was released almost a month after the close of the 2025-26 fiscal year. The 2024 Budget estimated the 2023-24 deficit at $40-billion, but the 2024 Fall Economic Statement put it at $61.9 -million. However, that revision reflected exceptional circumstances, including the booking of $16.4-billion for Indigenous contingent liabilities and another $4.7-billion for COVID-19 pandemic losses. No comparable exceptional circumstances appear to explain the 2026 revision.
When Finance Canada finalized the SEU, it likely had financial data for the first 10 months of the year, even though it may not have had the monthly results for February and March 2026, or the year-end adjustments. In addition, it would have been tracking daily cash balances, which likely showed strength near the end of the year. Given this information, it is important to understand what changed between the SEU and the budget to produce such a large downward revision to the deficit estimate.
The improved fiscal outcome for 2025-26 cannot be attributed to a burst of stronger economic activity at the end of the fiscal year. Indeed, real GDP did not grow in the first quarter of 2026. The rise in the price of oil, which has since lifted nominal GDP, did not begin until late February. Even the Parliamentary Budget Office missed the improved fiscal outlook. In its Oct. 20, 2026 pre-budget report, it used a 2025-26 deficit slightly higher than in the SEU and projected average annual deficits of $67.7-billion.
The government did not publish the Public Accounts for 2025-26 before the 2026 Budget, making it harder to understand the forecast revision and evaluate its implications for future years. Even with the Public Accounts, it is difficult to discern the reasons for the discrepancy.
The final figures for personal income tax, corporate income tax, and GST revenues exceed the SEU estimates by 3.2, 2.7 and 3.6 per cent, respectively. These substantial and consistent revisions across the major tax components warrant further explanation. Excluding “pollution pricing proceeds to be returned to Canadians,” the ratio of budgetary revenues to GDP rose from 16 per cent in 2024-25 to 16.2 per cent in the final 2025-26 figures. This slight rise in the overall effective tax rate might account for $6-billion of the almost $15-billion revision to the SEU revenue estimate, leaving about $9-billion attributable to other factors yet to be identified.
As might be expected, the SEU was quite accurate on the major transfers to individuals and to provinces and territories. The underspending occurred in direct program spending. The available information does not permit further analysis because neither the SEU nor the 2026 Budget breaks down this large spending category.
A significant lapse in defence spending might be suspected, given the large increase in its budget. However, the SEU provided no defence spending figures. Further, the budget provides no information on whether the underspending in 2025-26 represents a saving or whether the government will reprofile it to 2026-27 and possibly beyond. Nor do we have information on how the government treated contingent liabilities when it closed the books on the 2025-26 fiscal year.
According to the 2026 Budget, the better-than-expected 2025-26 result lowers projected deficits by an average of $33.2-billion annually through 2030-31 compared with the SEU, before new measures. This is a surprising change in just six months.
Compared to the SEU, the budget projects nominal GDP to be higher by an average of $48-billion per year from 2026 through 2030, as a result of slightly higher inflation. With an effective tax rate on GDP close to 16 per cent, this would explain only about $8-billion of the $33.2-billion average annual deficit improvement since the SEU. Other key economic assumptions, including interest rates, have changed little since the SEU. Understanding this marked improvement is important for three reasons: its magnitude; the government’s expectation that it will persist for years; and the fact that Budget 2026 used all this fiscal flexibility, leaving deficit and net debt profiles almost identical to those in the SEU.
A primary purpose of the SEU is to establish the economic and fiscal context for developing the budget. Outside the federal government, the SEU created an expectation of annual deficits averaging $58.7-billion from 2026-27 through 2030-31. Yet the budget reveals that before its new measures, projected deficits averaged roughly half that amount, at $27.4-billion annually, falling to $20.4-billion in 2030-31. This suggests that the government could have envisaged a path to a balanced budget within the planning horizon. Had this been known, public policy debates, including budget deliberations, would likely have been quite different.
In our system, Parliament holds the power of the purse and holds the government to account. However, parliamentarians can only fulfil this fundamental duty if they receive accurate information. Given the importance of the revision in shaping the 2026 budget and its potential implications for pre-budget consultations and fiscal policy choices, we recommend two steps to provide greater clarity and improve future fiscal reporting.
First, parliamentarians should seek a fuller explanation of the substantial forecasting revision over just a few months, particularly in the absence of significant new economic developments, and examine how the government incorporated the revised figures into its fiscal planning. The investigation should also address how much of the late-year improvement should carry forward into lower deficit projections. A parliamentary committee could request that the Parliamentary Budget Office conduct this investigation.
And second, the government should review the new annual cycle of fiscal documents. It should not release the Spring Economic Update until it has a clearer picture of the fiscal year that has just ended, nor should it release the budget before publishing the Public Accounts. The International Monetary Fund and the PBO have recommended that the Accounts be released every year no later than Sept. 30. The government missed that deadline by more than a month in 2026.
Understanding the source of this gap and improving our collective capacity to anticipate such changes are essential elements of sound fiscal management. This time, the revision revealed an improved fiscal position, allowing the government to increase spending. However, a similar revision in the opposite direction could require more difficult fiscal choices.
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