Fixing Canada’s Asylum Policy

From: James Yousif
To: Immigration Observers
Date: March 3, 2026
Re: Fixing Canada’s Asylum Policy

For an organization with a budget of nearly $350 million and 2,500 employees, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada is something of a mystery.

Structurally, it is an outlier, at “arm’s length” from government. Most organizations of that size and scope do not have the authority to develop public policy without the involvement of ministers, deputy ministers and possibly cabinet. But the IRB possesses policy authorities into which the rest of government has limited lines of sight.

This may help explain how the IRB was able to adopt a policy that dispensed with core adjudicative safeguards, and accepted refugee claims solely based on the written application, without in-person hearings. This has significant implications for the integrity of Canada’s refugee system.

In the context of the policy reforms and budget allocations of 2010, the IRB promised to bring an end to a long-standing backlog of asylum claims. New time-processing standards for asylum hearings were established and supported by the hiring of a new, permanent staff of adjudicators.

In the years that followed, promised targets were not met, and by 2017 a new asylum backlog had emerged. The government commissioned an independent review during which “major structural reform” was considered. The options included the possible dissolution of the Refugee Protection Division, which is the IRB tribunal that hears asylum claims and decides who receives refugee protection, and the transfer of its function into the IRCC departmental framework. Under immense pressure to demonstrate a higher rate of decisions the IRB took drastic measures.

Negative decisions – rejecting asylum claims – consume time and resources because they must be carefully written in anticipation of appeal. By contrast, positive decisions can be made rapidly and in large numbers. The IRB developed a policy called “File Review,” which allowed asylum claims to be rapidly accepted in large numbers from a list of countries based on the untested written application and documents in each file, and without refugees being questioned at a hearing.

The policy appears to have been implemented unilaterally, without the approval of ministers or cabinet. Between January 2019, and February 2023, 24,599 asylum claimants were accepted without being asked a single question.

This policy is problematic, as I document in a new C.D. Howe Institute study. Not all asylum claims are truthful, and documents may be forged. The asylum hearing also serves as a screen for national security and program integrity risk and must be halted if red flags emerge during questioning. But this security screen cannot be triggered if claimants are never questioned.

More broadly, the IRB’s recognition rate for asylum claims has climbed to 80 percent of claims decided on their merits, excluding files summarily closed where the claim was withdrawn or abandoned. In comparison, in 2024 Ireland accepted 30 percent of claims on the merits, Sweden 40 percent, and Germany 59 percent. Research suggests that acceptance rates are a significant factor in asylum seekers’ choice of a destination country.

It is difficult to isolate the effect of any one policy change on the level of new claims, especially given rising global migration pressures and changes to temporary immigration policies.

That said, it is worth noting that the number of new asylum claims in Canada has increased since the IRB began rapidly accepting claims. A backlog of 17,000 claims in 2016 has grown to nearly 300,000 in 2025. Policies such as File Review, intended to reduce the backlog, have not only failed to do so, but may have reinforced perceptions of speed, success, and reduced scrutiny, signalling to the world that Canada’s asylum system is easy.

How was it possible for an adjudicative tribunal to implement a policy that dispenses with the act of adjudication?

Canada's IRB has enjoyed an extraordinary degree of institutional independence since its creation in 1989. In most OECD jurisdictions, the executive controls asylum policy, not the tribunal itself. This allows for a tribunal which is sufficiently independent, but which is located within a departmental structure that allows ministers to have visibility and policy oversight. By contrast, Canada's IRB is disconnected from the rest of government and opaque.

It has the power to change Canadian asylum policy in profound ways, and it is not required to ask for permission to do so. It may be time to rethink this model. Asylum policy should be made by ministers and cabinet, not the IRB.

James Yousif is a lawyer, former director of policy at IRCC and former member of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB).

To send a comment or leave feedback, email us at blog@cdhowe.org.

The views expressed here are those of the author. The C.D. Howe Institute does not take corporate positions on policy matters.

A version of this Memo first appeared in The Globe and Mail.