Nation-Building in Practice: A Framework for Prioritizing Major Projects in Canada

by David Jones and Tasnim Fariha

• Canada’s Building Canada Act gives the federal government broad discretion to designate projects as being in the national interest but provides limited guidance on how such decisions should be made. This paper develops a rigorous, evidence-based methodology to support more transparent and consistent major project assessments by the Major Projects Office (MPO).
• Using a simplified multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) framework, the study operationalizes the Act’s five existing criteria through defined sub-criteria and applies the methodology to a sample of 17 proposed projects to test its practicality. The resulting scores and rankings are indicative and intended to demonstrate the framework rather than prescribe project selection.
• The analysis shows that project rankings are highly sensitive to government objectives and weightings, with more advanced “shovel-ready” projects tending to score higher when execution certainty is emphasized. This highlights unavoidable trade-offs between speed, economic resilience, clean growth, and Indigenous considerations.
• The paper recommends adding “additionality from designation” as a sixth assessment criterion, developing standardized data templates for proponents, and more clearly calibrating criteria weightings to ensure that project designation improves value for money and crowds in private investment.

Introduction

Purpose

The Building Canada Act, enacted through the Government of Canada’s Bill C-5, allows the Governor in Council to designate projects as being “in the national interest” (House of Commons of Canada 2025). When a project is designated, the federal government effectively decides to grant approval for those projects – with respect to permits, licences or other approvals which are required by existing laws and regulations – to enable the project to proceed, subject to any specified conditions. This authority has the potential to streamline project development and to accelerate project investment across the public and private sectors.

Since the passing of Bill C-5, the Government of Canada has established the Major Projects Office (MPO) to streamline federal regulatory project approval and help structure project financing – in partnership with provinces, territories, Indigenous Peoples, and private investors – and to support the government in considering which proposals should be designated as “national-building” projects.The government states that not all projects referred to the MPO will be designated under the Building Canada Act, but designation is one available tool to support regulatory streamlining (Government of Canada 2025).

The purpose of this Commentary is to develop a methodology to facilitate a rigorous, evidence-based consideration of which proposals should be designated as national interest projects. In practice, this may be a similar question to considering which projects should be referred to the MPO in the first instance.

This paper is not “starting from scratch” because the Building Canada Act contains a non-exhaustive, discretionary list of factors (criteria) to inform which projects are in the national interest and should be designated (Figure 1). However, applying these factors in practice requires a methodology that builds on and substantiates the government’s initial list of criteria, draws on available evidence, and enables evidence-based, transparent conclusions. Such a methodology is needed both in the near term – to assess existing proposals and infer government priorities – and on a forward-looking basis, to remain applicable to the assessment of emerging project proposals. Indeed, this paper applies the proposed methodology by presenting indicative results and rankings for existing project proposals.

Major Projects Office (MPO)

The first set of projects referred to the MPO by the federal government has already achieved many key regulatory milestones and undertaken extensive engagement with Indigenous Peoples, as well as provincial governments, local authorities, proponents, and other stakeholders. For these projects, the MPO’s role is to support the projects to close remaining regulatory and permitting gaps, coordinate with provinces and territories, and support the finalization of financing plans. The MPO is expected to recommend to the federal government the most efficient path to completing approvals, which may or may not include designation, so that proponents can make timely investment decisions.

Looking ahead, the MPO is expected to play a more proactive role in early assessments of potential major projects to support the government in its decisions around selection and designation. According to the federal government’s announcement, the MPO will help identify projects that are in Canada’s national interest and, once a project is designated, accelerate its development by creating a single set of conditions, reducing approval timelines to a maximum of two years, and advancing a “one project, one review” approach with provinces and territories (Government of Canada 2025). Further details regarding the full regulatory process will require additional discussions and consideration by the government.

Wider Context

To ensure that the outputs of this report are relevant to policymakers, it is important to understand Canada’s national context and the broader international geopolitical environment, which together form the backdrop to Bill C-5.

Canada has the ninth-largest economy in the world, but it faces a combination of longstanding economic issues, recent external threats, and complex prioritization challenges. Although stagnant productivity is largely a global trend over the last two decades, Canada has lost ground relative to other major economies. Over the last 40 years, labour productivity in Canada has grown by 40 percent, compared to roughly 100 percent in the US over the same period (Kronick, Eichenbaum, and Alexopoulos 2024). At the same time, affordability concerns have grown due to relatively high inflation during the 2020s (Bank of Canada 2025).

Many Canadian businesses exporting to the United States now face significantly higher tariffs under the current US government. With nearly one-fifth of Canada’s GDP tied directly to exports to the US (Scotiabank 2025), such tariffs impose substantial additional economic risk. Subsequent federal government support measures for businesses and households are indicative of the impacts felt (Government of Canada 2025).

More broadly, the desire to deliver stronger and more resilient economic performance sits within a wider set of government objectives, including Indigenous reconciliation and Canada’s new Climate Competitiveness Strategy. At times, these objectives may go hand-in-hand with economic growth, such as project equity-share arrangements or opportunities in renewable energy. In other cases, they involve trade-offs, particularly for projects with adverse environmental impacts or significant Indigenous opposition.

Overall, these challenges provide the backdrop for the Building Canada Act and indicate the range of issues the government seeks to address through nation-building projects. This context is reflected in the government’s initial non-exhaustive, discretionary list of factors (criteria) used to assess whether a project is in the national interest (Figure 1), which is discussed in detail further below.

Methodology and Approach

Given the range of criteria potentially relevant to the consideration of proposed projects, this report uses a simplified form of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). MCDA is an analytical tool which can support the ranking of different alternatives against a range of criteria (UK Department for Energy Security & Net Zero 2024). It is used to develop an evidence-based set of viable options, capturing input from experts and stakeholders, and is a relevant methodology in instances involving complex technical trade-offs across competing objectives (UK government, HM Treasury 2022). The Government of Canada does not appear to have published guidance on the use of MCDA. Accordingly, this report draws on UK government guidance, which is an internationally recognized example of good practice (UK government, HM Treasury 2025).

The application of MCDA in this report follows a sequenced approach, as illustrated in Figure 2. Each step is discussed in detail in the following sections. Each of the steps was subject to quality assurance, including through external peer review, as explained below. Due to data limitations, the wide range of potential projects, and the time-sensitive nature of this assessment, this report adopts a simplified version of MCDA, as discussed further below. Nonetheless, the main principles of MCDA were implemented.

For example, in lieu of a formal decision conference facilitated by an MCDA practitioner (which can help to bring together a wide range of perspectives), this project undertook two rounds of stakeholder engagement across the methodology, scoring, and results. In addition, given data limitations for several of the potential projects (as some are still at a relatively conceptual stage), a more simplistic scoring scale was used (from 1 to 5) to avoid the risk of spurious accuracy. To ensure robustness, the project-by-project data analysis was undertaken independently by the authors, and initial draft scores were discussed prior to setting the final scores within this paper.

Criteria

The Building Canada Act sets out five non-exhaustive criteria (Figure 1) that the Governor in Council may consider when designating projects as being “in the national interest” (House of Commons of Canada 2025). In developing the methodology within this report, we considered two core questions:

• Whether additions should be made to the five non-exhaustive criteria within the Building Canada Act.
• Whether the five criteria require further definition, and if so, how these criteria should be defined.

To address the first question, we considered a wide range of potential factors as potentially relevant criteria, including through internal analysis and discussions with experts. We then cross-checked these factors against the five existing criteria already set out in the Act. This exercise indicated that the Act’s non-exhaustive criteria provide a helpful overarching framework for the assessment criteria and that most of the additional factors identified could be nested within the existing five criteria. There are, however, a small number of exceptions, which are discussed further below and warrant additional analysis.

Regarding the second question, while the five overarching criteria are clear, they remain high-level. Assessing projects against these criteria alone would likely generate a degree of subjectivity. To support a more rigorous, evidence-based methodology, there is a strong case to define the criteria in more detail.

Accordingly, this report adopts an approach that uses the identified factors to define and substantiate the existing five criteria. For each criterion, we therefore set out a series of sub-criteria, as shown in Table 1.

List of Projects

Due to the dynamic nature of the discussions around major projects, this report analyzes a relevant range of projects at a point in time, reflecting current national and provincial-level discussions. In August 2025, we undertook research on potential major projects raised at the federal and provincial levels, supported by input from a small group of experts. This process produced an initial list of 30 potential projects.

On 4 September 2025, The Globe and Mail published a high-level list of 32 projects based on the proposals submitted by premiers to the prime minister. Due to the overlap between our initial research and the list published by The Globe and Mail, the two lists were combined into one, containing 45 potential projects.¹1 Projects that represent overarching bundles of initiatives were not treated as single projects in this analysis. Instead, the individual projects under those broader frameworks were evaluated separately. For instance, the Eastern Energy Partnership is an overarching regional clean-energy infrastructure initiative in Canada, focused on the eastern provinces (Atlantic Canada) and aiming to transform the region into a major clean-energy hub. Wind West Atlantic Energy, which falls under this initiative, was therefore considered individually as a proposed project. Online Appendix 1 provides a full list of the projects, of which 17 were reviewed in our analysis in detail.

Project-by-Project Research

This report seeks to set out an evidence-based methodology for project assessment and therefore prioritizes in-depth analysis. At the same time, the assessment is time-sensitive, given live, ongoing government discussions. To balance depth with breadth, we applied and tested the methodology at a granular level by reviewing a small number of projects (17 in total) in detail.

To ensure relevance of these assessments, this sample includes the initial five projects and six “transformative strategies” announced by the federal government on 11 September 2025. To broaden sectoral coverage, we also selected an additional six projects from The Globe and Mail longlist, including clean energy, power transmission, pipelines and transportation projects. For these projects, we undertook a detailed analysis against all the criteria and sub-criteria. Online Appendix 2 contains accumulated research for four projects to demonstrate the detailed data collection and analysis undertaken.

The research and data collection process prioritized reputable sources, including government analysis and announcements, available business cases and cost-benefit analyses, peer-reviewed journal articles, and expert reports. We sought both quantitative data and qualitative evidence. In cases where projects remained conceptual or information was confidential and/or high-quality sources were not available, we supplemented the analysis with broader sources, including stakeholder views and media reports.

Indicative Scoring by Criterion

To support rigour, two assessors (the co-authors) independently scored each of the 17 projects using a common dataset developed by one of the authors. The scores were then cross-checked between the authors via a subsequent discussion. This replicates – albeit at a high level – the workshop phase within MCDA guidance (UK Department for Energy Security & Net Zero 2024).

Each sub-criterion was initially scored from 1 (performs very poorly against the criterion) to 5 (performs very well against the criterion). In line with the MCDA methodology, scores were assigned on a relative basis across projects. For example, a score of 5 would constitute the best-performing project for that sub-criterion. Prior to scoring, we first undertook the detailed data collection, research, and analysis for each project to ensure that the full set of information was available prior to scoring.

Ideally, scores by sub-criteria were set based on our assessment of performance against a set of standardized metrics. However, because comparable data were not consistently available across the 17 projects, the scoring process required some degree of judgment. This limitation is discussed further below.

We aggregated sub-criterion scores to create the aggregated scores for each criterion. For simplicity and replicability, most criterion scores reflect the average of their sub-criteria. The exception was criterion 3 (likelihood of successful execution), where evidence of project development was weighted at two-thirds and sectoral precedent at one-third.²2 For example, mines typically have very long build times within Canada, so precedent might suggest that mines have a low likelihood of execution in a timely fashion. However, where proposed mine projects (either new mines or enhancements) have already gained many (or all) of the relevant permits and approvals, the likelihood of execution is significantly higher, and therefore it is more accurate to give a larger weighting to evidence of proposal development.

The cross-check discussion between the authors was used to review any major points of difference and to ensure that both assessors had appreciated all relevant pieces of information. However, to ensure robustness in the methodology, each assessor was responsible for their own final scores. In most cases, assessors did not alter their scores after the discussion because the assessors determined that they had already fully considered the available information. While the results presented in Table 3 and Figure 3 reflect the average of the two assessors’ scores, Figure 6 also presents the indicative scores assigned by each assessor individually.

Figure 3 shows the indicative scores for each of the 17 projects assessed, for each of the criteria, based on the scoring approach outlined above. For many projects, there is considerable variation in scores between the various criteria. Only a few projects score consistently well across all the criteria, such as the Contrecœur Terminal Container Project in Montreal.

To demonstrate how the scores were developed, Table 2 provides an example of the detailed scores for the first of four small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) at Darlington. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) and the Government of Ontario have both approved construction, and pre-work construction has already been undertaken, demonstrating private-sector commitment, so it scores well in criterion 3 (likelihood of successful execution). The project also scores relatively well in terms of economic benefits (criterion 2), with the Ontario government estimating that it could contribute $38.5 billion to Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) over 65 years.

However, the first SMR is relatively modest in size. The number of direct steady-state jobs (estimated at 200) for the first SMR is not as significant as some other proposed projects (for example, the Red Chris Mine Expansion estimates it will employ 1,500 people during the operational phase). In addition, there is some uncertainty as to the future total cost and impact on consumer energy bills because nuclear SMR technology is still in its infancy and considerable financial support has been required from the Government of Ontario and the Canada Infrastructure Bank. Nuclear energy can provide a baseload source of energy generation as a complement to intermittent renewable energy sources (such as solar and wind), while the SMR technology enables benefits to be realized earlier than construction timescales for large nuclear plants – this is also reflected in criterion 2.

All scores in this report should be considered as indicative. The primary purpose of the analysis is to demonstrate the methodology and analysis undertaken, and to support the development of an evidence-based assessment process. In practice, the MPO and the federal government are likely to have a more granular level of information available to undertake assessments, and with this additional information, it is likely that the scores could differ.

Table 3 provides a further example of the types of considerations that informed scoring across projects, using the McIlvenna Bay copper mine and the Red Chris mine expansion as examples. Ideally, projects would be compared using standardized measures and metrics. In this study, we have compared projects using the information available and have used points of comparison to inform the scoring. Consistent with MCDA methodology, scores were assigned on a relative basis, with higher scores indicating better performance against the criteria. Data limitations are discussed further below.

Weightings

Three illustrative scenarios were modelled, as set out in Table 4, with each scenario having a different distribution of weightings across the five criteria. Scenario analysis using different weightings is used to illustrate the impact of changing the balance of objectives across geopolitical, economic, and domestic political considerations.

Scenario A applies equal weighting across the five criteria. Scenario B assigns 50 percent of the total weighting to the likelihood of successful execution, with the remaining weightings distributed evenly across the other criteria. Projects that are well-defined and advanced (e.g., in terms of permits and approvals) score well in this category, and therefore, it maximizes the opportunity for “quick results.”

Scenario C allocates the full weighting to the first two criteria, irrespective of the other three criteria. We refer to this scenario as “economic potential” because these first two criteria are focused on economic resilience and growth. Arguably, these first two criteria represent the primary desired outcomes of the Building Canada Act, whereas the other criteria are concerned with how this is delivered.

However, this scenario is intentionally hypothetical, as the other three criteria remain critical considerations in practice. Scenario C is included to illustrate the implications (in an extreme case) of focusing project prioritization towards the first two criteria.

Indicative Project Rankings

Table 5 provides an indicative view of the top five-ranked projects, along with each project’s score, across each of the three scenarios. As noted above, these rankings should be treated as indicative rather than definitive. These rankings are intended to provide a directional indication of how potential projects perform against the criteria and sub-criteria. For any given project, the overall (aggregate) score varies across each scenario because the scenarios apply different weightings to the scores for each criterion. The limitations of the analysis are outlined further below.

Scenario A: The indicative top five projects span a range of sectors, including ports, electricity transmission, renewable energy generation, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and mining. As Scenario A has equal weightings across all five criteria, many of the top-ranked projects scored reasonably well across all five criteria. Projects received lower scores if, for example, they were at a relatively conceptual stage or if there were environmental and Indigenous-related concerns.

Scenario B: With a much larger weighting on the likelihood of successful execution, projects which are well-developed and closer to construction move up the rankings, relative to Scenario A. Under this scenario, the indicative top five aligns exactly with the first five projects referred to the MPO. For example, the Red Chris Mine and Darlington Nuclear projects both move up the rankings into the top five simply by placing a greater weighting on the third criterion, which refers to the likelihood of successful execution.

Scenario C: As noted previously, this is a hypothetical, extreme scenario, where economic potential is the overriding consideration. Using these weightings for the criteria creates a further change to the indicative rankings. For example, pipelines score more highly in this scenario, whereas projects focused on power transmission and “clean” energy projects move in the opposite direction. LNG Canada Phase 2, one of the first five projects referred to the MPO, continues to score well while others fall down the rankings. For example, the North Coast Transmission Line in British Columbia is expected to be high-cost, but there does not appear to be a cost-benefit analysis undertaken.

Analysis and Insights

Drawing upon the results in the previous section and examining them in more detail, there are several analytical takeaways.

(1) “Shovel-ready” projects tend to obtain higher scores and rankings

Potential projects typically progress through multiple stages, including conceptual design, location of a proponent, business case, impact assessment, consultations, obtaining permits and approvals (as well as any amendments to meet conditions), and final investment decision, construction and operation. There may also be interdependencies, such as rail or road infrastructure to support port expansion.

Projects that are further along the development journey will be better able to meet the criteria in several ways. First, the project proposal will be better developed – if not completed – which increases the likelihood of successful execution and the reliability of forecasts for economic benefits. Second, the project is more likely to generate economic benefits in a timely fashion, as it is closer to operationalization. Third, more robust information is typically available to justify the economic benefits. While it is appropriate to evaluate potential projects based on the information available, this creates a limitation of the analysis by disadvantaging conceptual, early-stage projects, which is discussed further below.

This pattern is mirrored in the first five projects referred to the MPO, which the government acknowledged were at an advanced stage of development, having “achieved many regulatory milestones” (Prime Minister of Canada 2025).

(2) The government should consider which stages of projects it wishes to support

These findings raise an important question about the federal government’s objectives in referring projects to the MPO and for designation. Is it seeking to get projects “over the line” which are relatively close to completion? There may be benefits in terms of minimizing any last-minute delays, although this is a fairly “low-risk, low-reward” strategy.

At the other end of the spectrum, designating projects or strategies that remain at a conceptual stage could significantly shorten implementation timelines. However, doing so carries a higher risk of prematurely backing projects that may not ultimately proceed or fail to meet the assessment criteria. Such a “high-risk, high-reward” approach transfers risks to taxpayers, both in terms of the potential for poor value for money for a given project, and through the opportunity cost of resources potentially diverted away from other, more beneficial projects.

There may be a sweet spot for designation for projects that have a clear business case and rationale but have yet to go through the various assessment and approval stages. At this mid-stage, there is sufficient assurance that the project will effectively meet the assessment criteria, while also providing genuine opportunities for value addition from designation. Indicatively, this proposition is illustrated in Figure 4.

These considerations apply not only to project approvals and permits but also to support in structuring project financing arrangements. Designation provides an explicit signal of government support, which can help to reduce uncertainty around project timelines, minimize financial risk, and increase comfort for potential investors (such as pension funds and other investors), which can help to crowd-in private sector investment.³3 Even without designation, referral to the MPO also offers the potential to support project financing.

This analysis has implications for the criteria used to assess potential projects. Specifically, there is merit in the government adding a sixth criterion: “additionality from designation.” In this way, the government would consider the additional net benefits accruing to the project from designation (taking into account the benefits of designation, as well as any costs, such as government gateways or risks). This assessment would go beyond the current five main criteria by specifically considering the potential impact of designation on key factors, such as project timescales and the likelihood of crowding in private-sector investment.

(3) More broadly, the criteria and sub-criteria merit further refinement

In testing the methodology with experts in policymaking and industry, various suggestions were offered regarding the criteria. Most of these issues had already been identified by the authors and included as sub-criteria. However, some present opportunities to further refine the criteria and sub-criteria:

• Distributional analysis. Distributional impacts are already recognized implicitly in several areas, including the fourth criterion (advancing the interests of Indigenous Peoples), and by considering household impacts (e.g., on energy bills) as one of the sub-criteria within the second criterion (providing economic or other benefits to Canada). Further refinement could include more explicit consideration of household affordability, employment impacts, and an assessment across different income deciles.
• International considerations. Some projects may have relevant international-level impacts. For example, support for nuclear SMRs in Canada through the Darlington project could generate lessons applicable to other countries, with global implications for energy generation and emissions that extend beyond Canada’s domestic energy mix and its 2050 net-zero target.
• Interdependence. While some projects may be relatively standalone, others will rely on associated infrastructure or wider government commitments. For example, port expansion requires associated investment in road and rail infrastructure. This report considers interdependencies and synergies to the extent possible, but at a more advanced stage the MPO could consider developing a systematic register to identify and track interdependencies when assessing projects.
• Advancing the interests of Indigenous Peoples. This criterion differs from the others because Indigenous Peoples are rights-holders with legitimate claims, such that minimum thresholds will apply. Further consideration should be given to the challenges of assessing this criterion in practice. For example, it is likely to involve an assessment of overlapping claims and differences in perspectives both within and between Indigenous communities.
• Future-proofing the methodology. This study uses precedent as a sub-criterion within criteria 3 and 4. While precedent may be informative, future assessments – particularly for emerging sectors, innovative business models, or new technologies – may reduce or remove its weighting, as precedent may be less relevant. Moreover, criterion 1 considers the risks to resilience from US tariffs, although this should be kept under review in the future as US government policy evolves.

(4) The government may wish to tailor its methodological approach for strategies

On 11 September 2025, the prime minister referred five projects and six “strategies” to the MPO. The announcement was explicit that these strategies are “at an earlier stage and require further development,” but that MPO will provide support to “advance these concepts” (Prime Minister of Canada 2025). This signals a commitment by the government to consider and support earlier-stage proposals, while also setting expectations for what projects will be formally referred.

In considering which strategies to support, the government could consider a separate strategy-specific assessment stream or adjust the project-based methodology. First, some leniency might be applied to the third criterion, because these early-stage strategies are, by nature, less developed. Second, the analysis of economic benefits (in the second criterion) should more explicitly consider synergies and multiplier effects across sectors and regions. For example, the Alto High-Speed Rail project seeks to align with housing creation along the route (MPO 2025). Therefore, assessing such strategies requires consideration not solely of the project itself, but also of the project’s alignment with wider initiatives which are dependent on government investment, implementation, and coordination. Third, strategies may merit a slightly wider definition of “benefits” under criterion 2, beyond simply economic benefits, to include related government priorities such as housing availability. While the Building Canada Act places the greatest emphasis on economic considerations, there is merit for the MPO and government to consider how far it may wish to stretch in terms of wider benefits and public impact.

The government may also wish to broaden its approach by considering nationally significant technologies which could cut across multiple potential projects. For example, federal support for Canadian-owned nuclear technologies, such as Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) technology, spans multiple jurisdictions. In addition, advanced manufacturing, data infrastructure, financial payments (such as stablecoins) and artificial intelligence offer economic growth opportunities for Canada. The government may wish to consider whether such cross-cutting investments could have sufficient materiality to constitute “national-building” initiatives, and if so, how they should be considered alongside projects and strategies.

(5) Some sectors offer potential “sweet spots” across the five criteria

Under Scenario A, the top seven projects relate to ports, mining and critical minerals, clean energy, electricity transmission, and transportation. These sectors have the potential to “tick all the boxes” through greater resilience (e.g., ports support trade diversification) and opportunities for economic benefits linked to clean growth (e.g., critical minerals are important for electric vehicles and energy storage).

However, the benefits accruing from investments in these sectors hinge upon the state of global markets. Port investments rely on sustained demand for Canadian exports, critical mineral projects depend on global commodity prices, and clean electricity generation and transmission must remain cost-competitive to deliver net benefits to consumers. While detailed forecasting of global market conditions lies beyond the scope of this report, such analysis is necessary to ensure that such projects remain net-beneficial and future-proofed.

(6) Project prioritization is sensitive to government objectives

Figure 5 illustrates how indicative project rankings vary across scenarios. Taking the first five projects referred to the MPO, the chart shows how their rankings change across the scenarios. In part, this is because the weightings change materially across the different scenarios. These variations demonstrate how different emphases in government objectives, reflected in alternative weighting scenarios, can materially influence which projects are prioritized.

(7) The government is likely to face trade-offs when making prioritization decisions

While scores for some sectors appear relatively resilient to the weightings – ports in particular – some trade-offs will be hard to avoid. For example, transmission networks can drive growth (including critical minerals), support grid resilience, and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. However, these projects are often costly, and those costs tend to be borne ultimately by customers. Fossil fuel developments have significant revenue potential for the government and the private sector (assuming sufficient certainty for private-sector investors) and can drive employment and growth. But such projects may have adverse environmental impacts and may be opposed by Indigenous groups. A project which faces considerable opposition would score poorly against these criteria, but it might be unfeasible to implement in practice.

Such trade-offs may also be intertemporal, across short-term and long-term priorities. For example, a higher pace of resource extraction can increase economic growth in the short-to-medium term, but may have trade-offs with longer-term implications, such as Canada’s net-zero 2050 target.

(8) Conclusions may differ between a project-by-project assessment methodology and a top-down approach

The government could assess projects on a project-by-project basis and designate only those that rank highest. Alternatively, the government may wish to have a balanced portfolio of projects across sectors to reduce economic portfolio risk through diversification. For example, the risk of investing in newer technologies (such as nuclear SMR or carbon capture, utilization, and storage [CCUS]) could be mitigated by parallel investment in tried-and-tested technologies. Some risks of prioritizing early-stage projects can be offset through support for other projects which are closer to completion. Trade diversification under the first criterion could also be enhanced by increasing export capacity on both the east and west coasts, thereby diversifying access to global markets.

Overall, while there is clearly a benefit in the government and MPO undertaking the assessments on an individual project-by-project basis, it should also step back and view the projects at an aggregate level, by considering the level of fiscal risk overall and the potential variance in combined project outcomes. This top-down analysis of different project combinations (e.g., across sectors, regions, or technologies) would complement project-level analysis, thereby supporting decisionmaking in the national interest.

(9) A methodology for project assessment can support evidence-based evaluation

Project assessment will inevitably involve a degree of subjectivity, because the criteria are not fully mechanistic. However, this report demonstrates that it is possible to improve evidence-based analysis through a well-defined methodology. Where criteria are set out transparently, this increases the likelihood of assessors’ ability to evaluate projects using the available evidence on a more consistent basis.

Figure 6 shows the scoring results across the two authors. While there are differences between the assessors’ scores for individual projects – and there are differences in rankings across the projects – there is a clear, high-level trend.

(10) The methodology should seek to create positive incentives for project proponents

A transparent methodology provides project proponents with clarity regarding factors that are valued by the government, such as timely economic benefits, a well-developed proposal, and advancing the interests of Indigenous Peoples. By highlighting issues that project proponents can action and address, this approach can incentivize project proponents towards delivering the outcomes that the government is seeking. For example, using Scenario A, the scoring in this report provides clarity that the proposal for critical mineral mining in Ontario’s Ring of Fire would score higher if a more developed business plan is produced, including benefit-sharing with Indigenous groups. Similarly, pipeline projects can increase their score by improving environmental performance, such as carbon capture and storage.

Greater transparency does, however, carry a qualification: criteria and scoring should not encourage or facilitate “gaming.” As the criteria are not purely mechanistic, assessors must retain some room for expert judgement, which includes critiquing any attempts to meet the letter of the criteria without addressing their underlying intent. For example, claimed economic benefits must be supported by robust evidence and forecasts, rather than speculative estimates.

Wider Considerations

While this report focuses primarily on project prioritization following Bill C-5 and the creation of the MPO, it is also important to consider the broader process.

First, the indirect impacts of designation and MPO referral require careful consideration. Designation could streamline regulation and accelerate project delivery, which would be a positive outcome. Alternatively, it could introduce an additional layer of assessment, creating delays. More ambiguously, it could cause reallocation of resources across potential projects. Government intervention can be effective if it minimizes uncertainty (particularly for potential private sector investors), corrects externalities, increases the efficiency of permitting processes or simply provides impetus to infrastructure financing and development across Canada. But centralization can undermine opportunities for market-based mechanisms to deliver financial viability and productivity.

Many of these impacts will only become clear during implementation, making it challenging to predict at this stage. Therefore, the government should evaluate and review the impact over time, examining both portfolio-level and project-level effects. This evaluation should also consider impacts on public and private investment, comparing designated and non-designated projects, as well as those referred to, or not referred to, the MPO.

Second, national concerns around timelines for project approvals point to a deeper root cause around the timeliness of existing approval processes. The Building Canada Act signals a willingness by the federal government to expedite existing approval processes in pursuit of greater national economic security and growth. This suggests a potential case for a broader, more holistic review of the regulatory landscape across existing approval processes, to seek to optimize across government objectives.

Qualifications and Limitations

This report seeks to develop an evidence-based methodology for assessing which proposals should be designated as nation-building projects. Several qualifications apply:

• Methodological focus. The primary focus of this report is to develop a more rigorous, evidence-based methodology for project assessment. Project-specific scores and rankings should be considered as indicative only.
• Methodological approach. This report does not undertake full cost-benefit analyses or impact assessments. A high indicative score does not imply that a project is net beneficial overall or financially viable. The government and MPO could consider applying absolute thresholds – such as minimum benefit-cost ratios, evidence of crowding in private investment, or minimum standards for relations with Indigenous Peoples – alongside relative rankings. The simplified MCDA approach used here could be extended in future to include more granular scoring (from 0 to 100), following the published MCDA approach to developing “swing weightings,” and a formal decision conference, facilitated by an MCDA practitioner (UK government, Department for Energy Security & Net Zero 2024).
• Project list. Given the evolving nature of discussions around major projects, the project list is not exhaustive and reflects relevance as of September 2025. For example, Keystone XL has been discussed by Canada and the US in the context of trade negotiations (Financial Times 2025). The focus is on developing a transferable methodology rather than capturing all potential projects.
• Criteria refinement. During external review, policymakers and industry experts offered various relevant suggestions regarding the criteria and sub-criteria. The previous section identifies several potential areas for further refinement, including distributional analysis and interdependencies. The MPO and government may wish to explore opportunities for alignment with the Canada Infrastructure Bank’s assessment framework.
• Data quality and availability. Data quality varied significantly across projects, and robust public information was not always available. Some projects (or strategies) are at an early stage of project development, with the scope of the project yet to be finalized. Due to the conceptual nature of some potential projects and the confidential nature of intergovernmental discussions, robust evidence has not always been available, and therefore, in some cases, our analysis has used wider sources (such as media articles) to obtain information. Ideally, a standardized set of information would be available to ensure a consistent assessment across projects on a like-for-like basis. The MPO and the federal government would be well-placed to mitigate this limitation through information requests.
• Impact of data limitations. Data gaps required the exercise of judgment and could disadvantage early-stage projects relative to more advanced ones. However, there is merit in maintaining a high bar for available evidence to provide assurance that projects will deliver value for money for taxpayers.
• Forecasting limitations. Economic benefits and opportunities are subject to fluctuations in national and international market conditions. For example, the financial viability of mining for various critical minerals will depend upon their market price, which is the subject of a range of global factors, such as production and pricing strategies by other countries. Similarly, demand for Canadian gas exports will be sensitive to geopolitical dynamics. While this report has sought to consider these conditions, the viability of each individual project will require further detailed sensitivity analysis, including by the project proponent.
• Public representations. This paper incorporates public information, statements, and representations by different groups, particularly within the fourth and fifth criteria. However, while these may be directionally relevant, such perspectives may not always indicate the final position of groups, given the need for discussion, consultation, and negotiation. This is particularly relevant for Indigenous perspectives and commercially sensitive project details. Assessments should therefore be clear about the nature and limitations of available information.

Conclusions

This Commentary sets out a methodology to facilitate a rigorous, evidence-based consideration of which proposals should be designated as projects of national interest. It demonstrates that a structured methodology can improve the analysis and transparency of major project assessments under the Building Canada Act. The analysis within this paper – both the methodology and the indicative scores and rankings – provides insights which can support the MPO and government as further assessments are undertaken. In particular, the scenario analysis highlights potential trade-offs, which may support the government in considering prioritization and balance across different objectives.

This paper also identifies limitations and outlines potential next steps to improve transparency, reliability, and the overall robustness of future assessments. By advancing the discussion on how major projects are evaluated, the paper aims to support outcomes that serve the national interest of all Canadians.

Based on the insights from the analysis, the primary recommendations for the MPO and the Government of Canada are as follows:

• Broaden the criteria for project prioritization by including “additionality from designation” as a sixth criterion, and by more explicitly considering the impacts on Canadian households, including affordability.
• Develop a standardized data request or template for project proponents – if not available already – to enable more consistent, like-for-like assessment across projects, supported by measurable criteria and standardized metrics and information.
• Carefully calibrate the balance and weightings across government objectives to ensure they reflect relative priorities, which will provide greater certainty for project proponents and support private sector investment.
• Adopt a broader perspective on project streamlining, including consideration of complementary policy levers such as a wider review of planning regulations and approval processes, to ensure that the government’s approach is effective in crowding in private investment.

The authors extend gratitude to Varun Bindal, Colin Busby, Dan Ciuriak, Dave Collyer, Rick Ekstein, Shaun Fantauzzo, AJ Goulding, Kate Koplovich, Sean Madden, Stephen Morrow, Daniel Schwanen, Gavi Stulberg, and several anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. The authors retain responsibility for any errors and the views expressed.

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